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Who (And What) Killed McMurphy?
Thoughts On The Tragedy Of Institutionalization
Roger A. Lohmann, Ph.D.
West Virginia University
Despite the generally optimistic and hopeful tone of
organizational goals and public policy, the general record of
residential treatment institutions, or asylums, and of efforts to
reform them have been equally unsuccessful. In this paper, it is
argued that the lack of success in basic institutional reform over
much of the past two centuries is, itself, a part of the tragic cycle
of institutionalization. A principle factor in the failure of reforms
(the tragic flaw, as it were) is the naive rationalism, which forms
the psychological and sociological basis of the dominant model of
institutional life used by institutional officials and reformers
alike. This rationalistic approach adopts a completely unrealistic
approach toward the principia media, or causal linkages through
which the implementation of public policy is to be accomplished.
Until planners break out of this mold, there is little reason to
suspect that the tragic cycles of institutions will be broken, except
by chance.

The Quiet Hours
Whatever happened to deinstitutionalization? Several years ago, the
professional and scientific journals were full of hue and cry on the
inhumanities of such places. And now, one is hard pressed to find anything at
all published on the subject. Yet, throughout the country one can find great
evidence of practical results in the latest half-way houses, community
treatment programs, partial hospitalization programs and so much more. The
most optimistic among us will interpret all this is true evidence of progress,
while the more cynical and those with historical vision may be less optimistic.
One thing which the latest round of reform research indicated: There
should no longer be any real question that the residential institutions which
offer shelter, service and the hope of rehabilitation to the cast offs of urban,
industrial life - the chronically ill, the emotionally disturbed, the mentally
retarded and others - are, in themselves, major social problems. That is, the
evidence seems incontrovertible that problems of power, brutality,
aggression, sexual assault, and other problems arise with some frequency in
such settings. Further, it is also clear that the usual organizational apologia
which cite such problematic conditions as isolated instances and not typical of
all institutions are about as meaningful as similar statements in other

settings. Because it is true that not all families raise delinquent children does
it follow that delinquency is not a serious social issue?
In the history of institutions, there appear to have been almost constant
cycles of pressure for reform, followed by innovation in program and practice,
followed by new pressures for reform. We appear to be in one of those interregnum periods at the present time. Before the next round, social scientists
whose moral commitments are in this area need to examine very carefully
some of the underlying philosophical and ethical commitments, and their
connections to action. In particular, we need to examine very carefully
whether the next round of public and professional outrage at the
inhumanities and depravities of institutional life and a sincere commitments
to making things better are in themselves sufficient for the task ahead.
This is a critical issue in social planning for several reasons. First,
although the rhetoric of planning is seldom used, residential institutions are
universally planned facilities. Moreover, they are problem - focused. Dating
back to the late Middle Ages, they are prime examples of both the limits and
the opportunities of social planning for the result of social problems.
The general tenor of the argument put forth in this brief paper is that
good intentions alone are not sufficient: That the entire history of
institutional reform in the United States, dating back over two centuries, is
largely a history of abuse leading to reform and reform becoming the basis of
further abuse. While we have, at each juncture, been inclined to see ourselves
as very enlightened, and our forebears as ignorant, it is not entirely clear
that we have progressively emerged from ignorance on this important
subject. In fact, it is entirely possible that present reform efforts may simply
be propounding and compounding the problems of asylum inmates by their
fervor for reform. It is by no means clear, for example, that the freedom-inisolation of the inmate released to a single-room occupancy (SRO) flat in a
high crime neighborhood is better off in any meaningful sense.
Anyone seeking intelligent, informed, and empirically-based solutions to
the general and specific problems of institutions cannot but help being
impressed with the generally dismal record of such reforms in the past.
Solitary confinement, isolation, bloodletting, lobotomies, and beatings are
among the reforms which have been posed by men of good will at one time or
another. It takes a substantial act of faith in the wisdom of our present age to
conclude unequivocally that contemporary practices, such as milieu therapy,
behavior modification, deinstitutionalization to SRO (single room occupancy)
rooming houses, or drug-based behavior control are unequivocally of a
different order from these earlier efforts. There is little in the history of
institutions, which would substantiate the appropriateness of such optimism.
In a very real sense, efforts at institutional reform have all too often started
and ended in failure: The best of intentions has been prelude to the worst of
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results. But make no mistake about it; the failures of institutions are not,
and have never been, due to lack of optimism.
We must look somewhere other than at the intentions and goals of
institutions and their reformers for an understanding of what has gone
wrong. That there is something wrong with contemporary residential
institutions seems to be beyond question, except in the minds of those whose
employment or other involvement with institutions offers them a sufficiently
self-interested motivation for denial of such a conclusion. While there are no
wide-scale, scientifically valid evaluations of the full range of residential
treatment institutions in our society, even a casual review of the broadest
possible range of literature on the subject, including literary works of art as
well as experimental and quasi-experimental behavioral research, field
studied, and ethnographies, journalistic and public affairs documents,
professional practice literature and a broad array of administrative and
public policy documents suggests a surprisingly uniform (and negative) view
of institutional life and its effects upon those who are benefiting from it.

The Case Against Institutions
Taken together, these divergent sources offer a powerful indictment of
institutional life, and a compelling argument for the need for reform.
Whether the immediate subject of discussion is prisons, juvenile detention
facilities, mental hospitals, institutions for the retarded, nursing homes and
homes for the aged, sanitoria, veteran's hospitals, orphanages, or some other
institution wherein persons with problems live-in as part of a program of
treatment, rehabilitation or societal convenience, much of the argument is
the same.
In general, the case against institutions is that these total institutions are
repressive and often demeaning and dehumanizing social and physical
environments, in which the individual resident is typically required to submit
obsequiously to the unbridled official authority of institutional staff, in
exchange for the benefits of the institution (to the person, society, or both);
that the purported benefits of the institution are often of very questionable
quality, or even lacking entirely; that the informal aspects of staff and
resident social organizations often work at cross purposes with official
institutional goals and objectives; that residents are physically abused,
humiliated, neglected, or in other ways dehumanized with depressing
regularity; that institutional life consists of brief, periodic events, which seek
to carry out the program of treatment or rehabilitation, separated by long,
uninterrupted and tedious periods or leisure in which residents are left to
occupy their time as they will; that conflict over control of space, equipment
and amenities is commonplace; and that there is a consistent history of the
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reforms of the past leading to the problems of the present, in a seemingly
never-ending circle.
It is the principle argument of this paper that the case of institutional life
in American society is a true manifestation of a tragic cycle, in which the best
of intentions and the best available information and knowledge contribute to
the dehumanization, degradation, and often premature death of a shockingly
high proportion of institutional inmates for reasons which are not sufficiently
known or understood at present that they offer a clear basis upon which to
build meaningful reform.
This view is well dramatized in the highly acclaimed and popular movie
version of Ken Kesey's novel, One Flew Over the Cuckoos-Nest. Support for
this view is also found in selected novels of Alexander Solzhenitsyn and
Charles Dickens; the essays of psychiatrist Thomas Szasz; the social science
of Erving Goffman, Thomas Scheff, and literally dozens of other less wellknown researchers; the poetic-philosophical musings of Burton Blatt; as well
as a substantial number of administrative reports and documents, and the
diverse writings of generations of patients and residents. What these diverse
sources lack in consistency of style, they share in point of view.

The Tragic Cycles of Institutions
Those of us in the tinkering trades tend, on the whole, to be inveterate
optimists. The woes of institutional life are generally regarded as indication
of great need -- problems to which we ought to tirelessly devote out time and
energy (and many are). We may even see this as an opportunity -- a chance to
challenge ourselves; apply our knowledge and skills, and contribute generally
to the betterment of mankind. Such optimism is, itself, it can also be seen as
evidence of the appropriateness of the tragic metaphor to institutional
circumstances. For one of the hallmarks of tragedy as a literary form is the
buoyant optimism that precedes the final fall?
In literary tragedy, such optimism is at its peak just before the fall -- the
denouement in which the tragic hero is finally done in and destroyed. Those
who would enter in to the reform of institutions need to ask themselves, in all
seriousness, whether and to what extent their efforts over a period of time fit
this cyclic pattern of optimism and failure.
Certainly, there is enough evidence from the past on this score to give one
pause. Throughout the early decades of the nineteenth century, the naive
optimism of reformers for institutions as agencies for eliminating poverty,
curing retardation, resolving madness, and reforming criminals was in all
cases, merely a prelude to the kind of obscenely horrid physical conditions
and wretched social circumstances later described by Rothman, Grob,
Deutsch, et. al.
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And what were (and are) the administrative, political, and professional
responses to these, and later, failures? Simply a realistic scaling down of
objectives for one thing. Mental hospitals, institutions for the retarded,
prisons, and almshouses, in turn, all moved away from their original
restorative and rehabilitative objectives in the latter 19th century and early
20th century toward purely custodial approaches. Examples of institutions
scaling down are also to be found in the modern era: Milieu therapy,
originally conceived to be an effort to bring the entire social and physical
environment of mental hospitals to bear upon the treatment of mental
illness, is quite often reduced to episodic group recitation sessions with little
or no broader meaning. Likewise, laudable contemporary efforts at deinstitutionalization in mental retardation, mental illness, aging, and juvenile
corrections have no real assurance of success. They may simply be extending
institutional controls in new directions and trading low-quality physical
environments and resource-limited social milieus of group homes for the
mass institution with its ancillary services. Curiously enough, progress in the
institutional field seems to be a multi-directional, or at least confusing,
venture. At the same time, a group homes were being adopted in some fields
(e.g. mental health and corrections) as innovative, personalizing, and
progressive, they are being abandoned with other populations (e.g. the aged
under such names as rest homes, boarding care homes) as unprofessional,
uneconomical and poor quality service delivery vehicles, in favor of higher
quality care in large, institutional nursing homes.
A trend toward specialization appears, historically, to have been another
response to institutional problems. The earliest forms of institutions in the
United States housed highly heterogeneous populations. Almshouses were
designed for the poor from infancy to advanced old age, and often included
widows, orphans, beggars, prostitutes, pickpockets, as well as an occasional
downwardly mobile gentlemen or two. Likewise, early asylums did not
differentiate between the mentally ill, retarded, congenitally deaf, aphasics,
epileptics, and a host of others whose odd behavior or communications
disorders were lumped together as indicative of insanity. Penitentiaries, the
third principle form of early institution in America, likewise often failed to
differentiate among the seriousness of offenses, ages or sexes of offenders, or
other distinction now taken for granted. Juvenile and adult defenders; felons,
and misdemeanants; and at times, men and women were all incarcerated
together.
This history of institutions is primarily a history of differentiation and
specialization, as one after another segment of these general institutional
populations was singled out for specialized facilities, and always in the name
of better service or care. This trend is clearly illustrated in the case of the
aged. Originally part of the general population of almshouses and poor
houses which populated the American countryside, (and, a large but
unofficial population of many state hospitals), institutionalized older persons
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have gradually come to be housed in their own category of institutions, and
these institutions have, in turn, become increasingly complex and specialized.
Thus, a provision in the original Social Security Act prohibiting financial
assistance to state and local institutions resulted in the formation of
hundreds (and perhaps thousands) of private and often for-profit rest homes,
boarding homes, and homes for the aged in the 1930's and since. Initially,
such facilities were essentially residential in character, but gradually, at
least some began to provide nursing care, and as federal fiscal supports and
state regulatory activities emerged in the 1940's and 1950's, the ideal type of
nursing homes entered our vocabulary. More recently, Medicare has forced
such institutions to specialize in extended care, skilled nursing care or
intermediate care, and a largely unheralded (and often unregulated network)
of personal care institutions has also emerged. Finally, federal housing policy
has enable the construction of several hundred thousand units of specialized
housing for older people. In design and administration, such units often
resemble more traditional residential institutions for older people more than
a little bit. Each of these newer, and more specialized facilities as well as
SRO (single room occupancy) hotels and apartment houses in most urban
areas today, and a staggering welter of public of public programs were
perceived as alternatives to whatever patterns of institutions existed at the
moment of their inception, while each in turn has recreated many of the
problems of institutional environments.
Similar patterns of failures followed by high hopes and new failures can
also be found in other areas of institutions. Proponents of social and
environmental, biological, and hereditary, and personal and moral
explanations of problems such as retardation and mental illness, seem to
follow in one another's footsteps with regularity; each critically dismissing
the efforts of their predecessors and proposing new solutions only to find
themselves, in time, supplanted by even newer solutions. Each group,
however, can rely upon the stable social structure of the institution to offer a
ready vehicle to the changes in its reform agenda: they need only capture the
administrative reins of power within the institution, in order to impose their
programs upon a docile, and often cynically resigned, audience of aides and
residents.

But, Why Tragedy?
Certainly, the best laid plans of mice, men, and institutions gang
agley. But in what sense is it warranted to call these patterns tragic? The
question is an intriguing one, whose fuller exploration I am undertaking
elsewhere: It is one which is significant for those who would undertake the
redesign of aspects of institutional life in two important respects: First,
because of the fact that institutions are consciously, purposely (and often
publicly) created social organizations, their failures must be seen as of a
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different order than the results of natural disasters, or the failings of
spontaneous social institutions. Thus, the death from neglect of an older
person living alone in her own home, and a comparable death from neglect in
a nursing home are qualitatively distinguishable in our ethical tradition, due
to the fact that the city and neighborhood in which the woman's house may
be located have not assumed direct, positive responsibility for her well being
in any meaningful or legal-contractual sense, while the institution has. Thus,
while the first death is morally reprehensible and lamentable to be sure, the
second is certainly tragic in the full sense of that term, in that it is a full
fledged failure of the benevolent goals of the institution.
It could be argued, however, in the example of neglect cited that such a
result is, merely the workings of human fallibility, an unavoidable
consequence of the existential plight of man. To be sure, certain essentially
random, accidental events detrimental to the best interests of persons may
occur in all types of human institutions, and the case against asylums ought
not to single them out on this dimension. However, it is also clear from the
literatures previously cited that a good deal of the dehumanizing
consequences of institutional life for residents are the direct result of the best
efforts and most progressive aspects of institutional life. It is this fact, more
than any other, which ought to make the institutional reformer truly humble,
and more than a little timid.
The group problem-solving techniques dramatized (according to group
practice theory) in scenes from One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest, for example,
are intended to be helpful and facilitative for troubled individuals, but are
dearly easily subverted in the movie as in real life into tools of patient
management and social control and quite easily contribute to the deteriorated
self-images of patients dramatized. Likewise, the resulting patient attitudes
and responses may not be rehabilitative in any sense, but instead the kind of
passive, submissive, apathetic response characteristic of so many
institutional residents in real as well as fictional institutions.
Ultimately, the reformer of institutions must deal with a very difficult
fact: The negative consequences of institutional life in no way arise because
the professional and technical staffs of those institutions are bad people in
any significant sense. Indeed, it may well be the case that the career lines
and recruitment patterns of the helping professions bring people who are
higher than average in intelligence, compassion, and decency to work in
institutions. And yet, the good intentions of these persons seem unable to
prevail against the strongly entrenched traditions, laws and rules, and
bureaucratic practices which characterize these social organizations. Just as
inmates do not come there to be dehumanized, so also staff members go to
work in institutions with expectations of helping (or at least, not harming)
them.
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And yet, the overall effect of institutional life is tragic in the purest sense
of that term. In addition to degradation and dehumanization, institutions of
all types lead to the premature deaths of substantial proportions of their
populations. In truly classic tragedy, the hero is destroyed in death because of
a tragic flaw. Likewise, the personal trouble or problem of the institutional
inmate, which forms the initial reason for entering the asylum whether it is
commission of a crime, retardation, mental disorder, physical infirmity (or
mere victimization when institutional admissions processes are not working
as they should), becomes the flaw which can lead to the ultimate destruction
of the inmate. Not all inmates die, to be sure, but death rates in institutions
are significantly higher than in non-institutional populations. When coupled
with other risks of institutional life, it is not at all difficult to visualize the
inmate as a tragic victim.
Entry into an institution, in itself, however, cannot be seen as tragic. To
fully understand the significance of the tragic metaphor, we need to look
further. We need to examine the incredible mismatch between the personal
traits of inmates and the environmental prerequisites of institutional life. Of
particular importance here is the tendency for an inordinately large
proportion of inmates in all types of institutions to display speech,
vocabulary, expressive, and other deficiencies.
It should be abundantly clear that criminal behavior, craziness, low
intelligence and infirmity are not, by themselves, sufficient conditions to lead
to the placement of someone in an institution. Many persons on the outside
display these traits as well. The process seems to also require rather active
involvement of a labeling nature, sufficient to bring the troubled person to
the attention of the proper authorities, negotiate the entry arrangements,
and the like. Under such social arrangements, the person who is
communication-handicapped, for whatever reason, is at a distinct advantage.
Unable to offer alternative explanations for their antisocial behavior, for
whatever reason or even to defend themselves effectively, such persons are
uniquely at risk of institutionalization. This explanation alone may account
for a substantial portion of the inmates in existing institutions. Among other
things, the known relationships between social-economic status and language
facility may go a long way toward explaining the peculiar affinity of all types
of institutions for low-income and under-educated persons.
The very same verbal difficulties which make it easier to commit those with
communications disorders have a marked implication for those already in
institutions: For one thing, those most in need of the institutions (that is,
those with the profoundest troubles)--the chronic schizophrenic, the
profoundly retarded, the aphasic stroke victim, and the autistic child, are the
most easily victimized in the institution, because they are the least able to
fend for themselves. Furthermore, in the institutional society with tis
bureaucratic overlay, those with the greatest handicaps become members of a
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kind of permanent outcast unable to respond appropriately to routines of
daily living; or to work the system which dispense privileges and rewards.
Thus, the ultimate tragedy for these inmates may not be death, but rather a
kind of half-life in which they are permanently unable to escape from, or to
function effectively in, an environment which demands of them skills beyond
their functional abilities.
What is the place of staff in this tragic scenario? We have already
suggested a general lack of malevolence on the part of those who work in
institutions. Such a statement, like all generalizations must be viewed as
appropriate but bounded; sadists and others who delight in torturing helpless
inmates are an ever p[resent threat in institutions. Furthermore, self-interest
on the part of the staff members seeking personal comfort, upward mobility
of some other personal end should not be discounted. There is also another
factor here, which is easily overlooked, and that is the personal
embarrassment, discomfort, and anxiety that the violations of normal social
rules and prescriptions by inmates or institutional procedures may cause.
Being spat upon, having to clean up human excreta on a regular basis, or
having to routinely strip and shower and redress 50 inmates in a morning are
not normal experiences in the every-day life of American culture. In fact, such
experiences come very close to violations of strong American norms in a way
that the fact that they are standard operating procedure in asylums should
not be expected to entirely vitiate. Thus, it is very likely that staff members
subjected to such experiences may, over a period of time, accumulate (in spite
of themselves) a host of resentments, frustrations, and petty grievances
toward those they are helping. These in turn, may easily lead to some of the
subtler forms of depersonalization that Goffman has so aptly catalogued.
Such responses only arise, it must be noted, because of the situational
juxtapositions of institutional life, and are not deep human quirks in these
persons awaiting emergence. The very fact of institutional life itself creates
and calls forth such responses.
Such situational considerations are a major fact of institutional life. In
fact, they take us back directly to the question of institutional reform. For the
key to unraveling (or eliminating) the tragedy of institutions rests ultimately
with entangling the kinds of emergent causal patterns just presented. In
many respects, the workings of unseen (or unanalyzed) causal patterns in
institutions, occupy a position comparable to that of the fates in classic
tragedy. Ultimately, the failure of institutional reform is largely a failure to
appreciate the significance of these fates. And, while it is not at all certain
that complete identification of these unseen causal forces will lead to the
improvement of institutional life, it is quite certain that the traditional,
mechanistic view of institutions as large social implements for reformulating
people into new and better persons definitely will not lead to such results. Of
particular importance, is the marked tendency among reformers to see
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institutions and their inmates in rational, goal-oriented, utility-maximizing
terms and to construct public policy accordingly.
In this traditional view, the institution is seen as a gigantic, rationallyordered mechanism for the achievement of mutually consistent beneficial
purposes: staff and patients alike work to protect society, rehabilitate
inmates, and solve problems in what is a common enterprise. Within this
enterprise, behavior (of both staff and inmates) is thought to e regulated
largely by one variety of what Mannheim referred to as the principia media of
social life, what is usually referred to as goal-oriented behavior. In this view,
the failures of this mechanism to achieve its purposes is due to one of two
causes: Poorly articulated, unrealistic, or inappropriate goals and objectives,
which have the effect of directing staff and inmate behavior in inappropriate
and counterproductive directions; and problems of implementation in which
staff members and patients, for reasons of psychopathology, personal selfinterest, culpability, or other personal failings, and inappropriate behavior,
fail to live up to the rational expectations of the goals and objectives.
From this viewpoint, solutions to the problems of institutions are
ultimately issues of motivation: either the goals and objectives which
motivate workers and inmates must be changed, or the subjective factors
(greed, pleasure, laziness, etc.) which interrupt the proper workings of right
reason must be neutralized.
Based upon this view, then, most contemporary reforms are built: these
may be new programs, which seek solution to previously unsolved problems
through new and varied definitions of inmate problems, new specifications of
causal linkages, or new interventions; or new organizational arrangements,
whereby problems of information-flow, authority, morale or some other
interpersonal difficulty may be eliminate; or new occupations or professions
may be introduced for their new slant on things.
In all instances, however, these reform efforts (which are largely efforts at
changes in implementation of the basic ideas of the particular institution)
proceed within the larger viewpoint which might be termed benevolent
rationalism that the people in the institution are good people acting in good
faith; and that their failures, therefore, are the shortcomings or human
frailty. The tragic model posed in this paper represents a fundamental
alternative to that view, and yet one that accepts its fundamental premises of
optimism: One need not necessarily reject the view that the sum of personal
intentions in institutions is positive simply by rejecting the rationalism of
institutions.
Although there are many interrelated aspects to this model for
understanding institutional worlds, the central aspect which links actual
empirical events in the everyday life of institutions with the public policy and
regulatory mechanisms which seek to regulate and control those events are
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two-fold: the assumption that all people including staff and inmates are at
heart, economic men who construct their behavior by calculation; and the
assumption that logical order is a sound basis upon which to establish a
volitional social order. The first of these might be illustrated by the
assumption (which we know to be naive) that every inmate has a uniform
desire to get better and leave the institution. The second is illustrated by the
organizational patterns which spatially segregate functional activities of the
organization--food services, recreation, medical services, dormitories, etc.--in
correspondence with the rational division of specialties and task assignments
within the employed sectors of the institutional organization.
For most reformers, rational problem-solving, (itself an extended series of
simultaneous syllogisms) becomes the principia media for understanding,
explaining and influencing the ongoing social dynamics of asylum life.
Despite a large, and growing body of evidence to the contrary, most change
efforts in asylum life are organized and proceed as though such rationalistic
accounts were sufficient and necessary accounts of social dynamics in the
asylum. Efforts to develop more realistic explanation of institutional behavior
must constantly be translated into the language and symbolism of this naive
rationalism, even (as in the case of reform efforts based in Freudian or
contemporary social psychological theories which explicitly reject such
rationalism and consequently are subverted by this very conversion process).
Perhaps the clearest example of this--because it is so widely practiced--is the
milieu therapy model, which is ordinarily translated into orders, policies,
operating procedures in most large institutions where it is implemented.
Gestalt quality is subdivided into task assignments and job descriptions
consistent with the rational bureaucratic milieu of the large institution. The
conflict here between the idea (and the ideal) of total environmental therapy
and the realities of the large institution are precisely pointed up by Weber's
contrast of charismatic and legal-rational authority. In the case, the
dynamics of routinization counter-act and neutralize the charisma of any
reform attempted.
One should not conclude from this that institutional reformers must be
completely non-rational, emotivist touchy-feely or even absurdist/irrational in
their approaching men to succeed and unbounded assumptions that all
human behavior is clearly guided by explicit/choice, and that all choices are
made deductively with perfect knowledge of the alternatives and
consequences are inappropriate.
The challenge is to replace economic psychology of rational choice with
social psychology as the basic language in which we construct our approaches
to institutional reform. If we do not, we continue to run the great risk of
continuing existing and creating new tragic patterns through policy and
reform, simply because the language and concepts of policy and reform are
completely insensitive to many of the controlling realities of institutional life.
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During the past two centuries, most institutions have been built upon
explicitly rational models, although the goals to be attained have varied
widely. Staff organizations are assumed to be rational task-oriented
organisms for implementing institutional goals. (Residents, by contrast, are
typically conceived as anomic individuals who are acted upon by the
institution, rather than in any overtly social terms). Likewise, the psychology
of actors assumed to operate in institutions are, from the standpoint of
conventional understandings, rational information-processing, and decisionmaking beings. (This rationalistic psychology is particularly ironic in the case
of institutions for mentally ill, retarded, and senile old people!)
This legacy of enlightenment rationalism in the form of a Weberian
bureaucratic vision of social organization provides the operational base for
most public policy regarding institutions and is also a strong component in
the management ideology of such institutions. It carries with it some quite
distinct (and inappropriate) elements that together form the nexus of action
for most reform efforts in institutions. The most important elements of this
model as a set of principia media are the following:
1. The view that because an institution is a created social institution
the principle process in creating and sustaining that organization is
the rational articulation of a hierarchy of general and specific
objectives which form the principle reference point for the behavior of
all concerned.
2. The view that there is a single, objectively determined, verifiable and
all-encompassing reality to which their behavior may be understood.
3. The view that all in the institution know and understand this reality
and are working cooperatively toward the optimal achievement of the
mutually accepted objectives expressed in its terms.
Together, these principia media offer an integrated set of causal chains
that rationalist reformers believe they must penetrate: the goals and
objectives (the policy) which are the basis of both behavior and perceived
reality. Such an approach is surprisingly inconsistent with contemporary
behavioral science perspectives on the nature of social, and particularly
organizational behavior. However, rather than attempting to take those
behavioral insights into account in the identification of more suitable
principia media upon which to build reform efforts, we continue to cast about
for ways of expressing the rational objectives in terms of the behavioral
sciences. Even the most vaunted milieu therapy is, from this perspective,
often only an effort at more comprehensive, exhaustive specification of
objectives. (A partial exception to this is the work of behavior modification in
institutions, which seeks to implement reform by harnessing the principle of
positive reinforcement in ever broader and more encompassing ways.)
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Such an approach is, by its very nature, heavily dependent upon the
formal organization and the official accounts of institutional life (like those of
Nurse Ratchet). Exclusive concentration upon this level fails to take into
consideration unofficial aspects of the organizational culture which can be
observed in most institutions; the peer groups, cliques, reference groups, and
other informal organizations which spring up; or even, the actual perceptions
of residents as to why they are there (as opposed to the official diagnosis).
Ordinarily, it also fails to take into account the physical environment and its
effects upon residents, the timing of entry, life in the institution, and the
nature and circumstances of release, or numerous other issues.
In summary, our existing knowledge of the actual everyday life of staff
and inmates in institutions has dramatically outstripped our collective
abilities to implement reform strategies based upon that knowledge.
Consequently, while we are becoming increasingly capable of sophisticated
explanations of why and how the tragedy of institutions occurs, but we have
not yet been able to implement effective reform strategies based upon these
newer insights.
The principal reason for these failures is that more sophisticated social
and psychological insights are, of necessity, translated into the terms of
rationalism in order to be implemented in the bureaucratic context as rules
and regulations for staff. In part, this is because staff members and inmates
tend, on the whole, to be accustomed to thinking in such rational terms.
This excessively rational psychology of human behavior and of social
organization, fails to take into account the nature and complexity of social
processes, and aspects of the physical world which we explain institutional
life. Thus, the tragedy of institutions is thoroughly understandable: It is as
though we had sought to build a modern space program upon a pre-Ptolemaic
astronomy which ignored the mathematics of multiple centers of gravity and
assumed only that the sun revolved around the earth! Planning for
institutional reforms which proceeds in this naively rationalistic manner is
risky, foolhardy, and in of itself, completely bound into the fabric of the
tragedy of institutionalization. Under such circumstances, the much heard
maxim,
Well at least we have to try is not only unwise and false; it is foolhardy.
Until a better grasp of the real dynamics of institutional life (and
particularly, of the principia media along with to implement reform efforts)
can be achieved, in action truly appears to be the wiser course.
We really can't say who killed McMurphy. Certainly, his friend and
protégé, the Chief, did in the sense of suffocating his comatose post-lobotomal
body. Kesey’s point seems to be that it is unclear, however, that he is any
more responsible for the ultimate destruction of the real, live, (and utterly
sane) person who was McMurphy or that his crime is more reprehensible
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than that of the anonymous surgeons who performed the operation effectively
destroying McMurphy's mind; or the ward staff (symbolized by Nurse
Ratchet) who assaulted his person, anarchic as it was; the intake staff, who
failed to unearth McMurphy's altogether transparent scheme to get a holiday
from prison; or McMurphy himself, whose deviant anarchistic disregard for
institutions, conventions and norms is finally normalized only by the
surgeons. Contemporary efforts to reform institutions must come to grips
with this indeterminate state of affairs before there will be any hope of
extricating those reforms themselves from the tragic patterns of alternating
hope and despair which characterize so much of the history of this tragic
social institution. The first step in this process must be clearer and more
realistic theoretical models of institutions that are not subverted by
optimistic rationalism.
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